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patti smith & sam shepard performing 'cowboy mouth' 1971

patti smith & sam shepard performing ‘cowboy mouth’ 1971

I

In the program notes to his 1971 collaboration with rock-poet/singer Patti Smith, playwright Sam Shepard offered the following statement in terms of his work in theatre: “I like to yodel and dance and fuck a lot. Writing is neat because you do it on a very physical level. Just like rock and roll. A lot of people think playwrights are some special brand of intellectual fruitcake with special awareness to special problems that confront the world at large. I think that’s a crock of shit” (Wade, 7). Two things, at least, are explicit in his statement: the assertion of a formal parallelism between the work of popular music, and that of his theatre, and the sense of the presentational, as opposed to representational, immediacy of that theatre given its absence of intellectualized mediation or over-conscious contrivance. Shepard’s theatre moves, assaults, seduces an audience with the kind of non-verbal, ritualized, kinetic and sensory receptivities attending any live rock event.

Shepard had, at least verbally, long resisted a formal identification of playwright, and in his relocation to London in 1971 actually sought an alternative creative life in rock music, and even judged the primacy of rock music as an artform more truly representative of his era than theatre or any other art practice (Gilman, xii). Music has generally always informed his understanding of art-practice; Laura Graham writes that “his influences were aural—the structure and rhythms of Rock and Jazz music. Shepard’s father trained him in jazz drumming in Shepard’s early teens; he witnessed the talent of some of the greats of American jazz while bussing tables at the Village Gate in New York. He participated in two groups [as drummer], the Moray Eels and the Holy Modal Rounders in the 1960s and ‘70s and admits to having practiced Jack Kerouac’s theory of jazz-sketching with words using the same principles as does a musician when jamming” (Graham, 3) and he has himself stated that “nothing communicates emotions better than music, not even the greatest play in the world” (1984: 179-80). With an imagination so deeply conditioned by the non-verbal modes of music—both in terms of an aesthetic of language more attuned to sound (and the emotive charge it carries, as above) than concept, as well as the personae of music performance—it is unsurprising that Shepard’s theatre is often dominated by an elevated figure representative of that music who partakes as much of mythology as of countercultural trend, is as much a necessary extension of an acutely ritualistic psyche as a canny codifier of contemporary cultural obsessions.

Much could be written about the musicality of Shepard’s theatrical language (and Robert Coe, in harmony with the playwright himself, speaks of “Shepard’s language as approaching the condition of Rock music” and compares him in that regard “with the Romantic poets who used language as evocative rhythmic sound in addition to its use as a vehicle of literal meaning” Graham, 5) but what is more compelling for this enquiry is to observe the way in which rock music and the varied mutations of its aesthetic and cultural significations, supports the erection, and as we will see, resurrection, of a mythic archetype.
In discussing Shepard’s particular codification of 20th century Romanticism, Graham writes that the romantic demonstrates “a stress on the individual and especially on the Hero and the actions of the Hero versus a corrupt or restrictive society; the Hero is seen as the potential savior of a weak society, and conflict in his later plays frequently devolves upon the attempted synthesis between society and the Hero/Individual” (ibid.). In the context of Shepard’s theatre practice of the late 1960s and early ‘70s, Graham’s formulation of the romantic hero serves well to describe its all-pervasive embodiment of the time: the rock ‘n roll star.

The heroic performers of the time, ranging from overblown psychedelic to polymorphous perverse to hermetic-apocalyptic ironic (one thinks of Morrison, Jagger and Dylan respectively) are legion, and in retrospect, eerily otherworldly, sometimes in possession of a skillfulness combined with sheer embodiment of novel expressivity so authentic that from the perspective of a tired neo-conservative post-turn of millennium, they would seem to verge on the divinely inspired (here one thinks perhaps most of all of Jimi Hendrix). Shepard and Smith’s writing, too, of Cowboy Mouth holed up together in the now-mythic Chelsea Hotel (Shepard reports that “She wrote her lines and I wrote mine” and that the play resulting was “the most important thing in my career” Oumano, 90) should be seen in the context of the deaths of some of the most powerfully iconic figures of the time: the years 1970-71 saw the overdose deaths of Jimi Hendrix, Janis Joplin, Jim Morrison alone. Others, such as Tim Buckley, Gram Parsons, and perhaps the ultimate rock ‘n roll savior of them all, John Lennon, were to follow.

The archetype and its profound force in the postmodern cultural psyche of the West is no less noticeable in our own time: the suicide of the ‘father of Seattle grunge’ Kurt Cobain in 1994 was globally mourned as if the passing of a veritable messiah, and not long after in 1997 the drowning death of Tim Buckley’s son Jeff Buckley is another, acutely romantic, loss of the Orphic voice which promises profound transference, only to leave those million—collective Eurydice to the lone Orpheus—abandoned in the strangely undefined yearning of a waking underworld. (The quite different martyrdom of Michael Jackson in his 2009 demise nonetheless embodied a triumphant puer Orpheus in his years of precocious ascension.)

In a number of plays of this period, Cowboy Mouth, Mad Dog Blues, The Tooth of Crime among them, Shepard invokes this yearning and offers up the rock hero/savior, Orphic representative of his time, as worthy sacrifice perceived “not through the intellect but through the ear, like music, through the eye, like visual art, and through the heart” (op. cit. 5), as in the modes of myth. Where Graham suggests that Shepard “shares the Romantics’ use of folk heroes as symbols, their emphasis on the theme of freedom versus conformity or societal restriction, their belief in the inherent superiority of intuition over reason and of subjective over objective reality and, in his later plays, the belief in the spiritual superiority of the Female” (Graham, 5), it will be questioned whether Shepard’s representation does in fact finally confirm to such attributes (in particular the last) or rather suggest a failure, or modified resignation, of the hero to achieve any idealized configuration.

Shepard’s appropriation of the archetype becomes, true of its postmodern surrounds, almost a critique of such long-rooted Western-humanist archetypal imperatives, as if his ambivalent rock-hero-saviours (reminiscent of Brecht’s anti-hero who in his early Drums in the Night refuses to go out and fight in war) would be saying ‘I really can’t do this, in this world, under these conditions, anymore.’ Shepard’s wielding of the mythic structures—and what Graham describes as his disclosure that the “myth is proven to be defunct; the Hero is shown to be inherently and irrevocably unheroic (the potential for Heroism is called into question); the Female becomes the survivor without the Male” (op. cit. 6)—prefigures the nominal deconstruction of such collective-cultural master tropes in our post-millenium. What is still interesting in these plays is the sense in which such negation is achieved even where by virtue of failure it points up the deep pathos of a contemporary culture still thirsting for the symbols it presumes to have de-naturalised itself of. The tale, the narrative, gets old-fashioned and dies, but the spectre in the psyche, the numen, always returns to haunt its neglect.

II

In an ironic reversal of Orpheus, as Cowboy Mouth opens, the male protagonist Slim (“who looks like a coyote…beat to shit” Shepard, 1972: 85) has also been exiled from his wife (and child) but here reluctantly “kidnapped…off the street with an old .45” by Cavale, “a chick who looks like a crow, dressed in raggedy black” (ibid.) already in the deeps of a bizarre and intimate rapport, where we are thrown into the semi-autistic static of their banter in media res. Cavale would seem to have already laid the groundwork for Slim’s transformation into rock ‘n roll savior, because already by his second speech-entry his response is unequivocal. Cavale, mad (later confessions reveal her past hospitalizations) or only strategically in denial, can’t hear Slim’s objections as she ferrets around for her dead, stuffed crow Raymond:

SLIM: Your Raymond! My wife! My kid! Kidnapped in the twentieth-century! Kidnapped off the street! Hot off the press! Don’t make no sense! I ain’t no star! Not me! Not me, boy! Not me! Not yer old dad! Not yer old scalawag! This is me! Fucked up! What a ratpile heap a dogshit situation! (87)

Slim’s rhetoric is unconvincing. Both he and Cavale are desperately in search of something the other only half-consciously appears to offer. Cavale, moreso than the remote, too-good wife and child, seems his truer lover and certainly muse, at least in this strange ritual—the eccentric chamber of their willed claustrophobia a substitute Hades where they are forced to work out the terms of an inchoate descent into the unconscious. Slim, though resistant, has already in his opening line spoken of “bad karma”, and in his passivity it is the elemental force of the with Cavale (she can talk to animals, even dead ones) who can lead him into some more radical meeting with himself and the time.

The adolescent in this pairing, Slim can only beat (“the shit out of”) drums and wail cheesy love-songs. Her depravity “makes me sick! It’s morbid and black and dark and dirty! Can’t you see what’s happening here?” (op. cit. 88.) She can, and she tells him “Fuck you […] Can’t you see what’s happening here? A dream I’m playing.” And Slim, long ago seduced, wants to know; like the little baby whose need of him he has just been appealing to, he begs her to “Tell me about Johnny Ace,” and submissive “goes to her and curls up in her lap” (ibid.).

Johnny Ace is Cavale’s first installment of the rock ‘n roll savior, but a flatly self-destructive one. Johnny Ace was “real cool, baby. Just like you” (88-89), but—

CAVALE: […] one day when all the girls were waiting, when everybody paid their fare to see Johnny Ace on stage in person singing sad and dressed in black, Johnny Ace took out his revolver, rolled the barrel like his 45 record, played Russian Roulette like his last hit record, and lost. Johnny Ace blew his brains out, all the people jump and shout […] (89).

The same image will close the play, but with a whimper, and not with Slim pulling the trigger. Though Cavale is quick to diminish its impact (“it don’t mean nothing, it’s just a neat story” 89) the metaphor for suicide as escape becomes her recurrent trope—escape being what Cavale, her self-chosen name, comes to signify at the very close of action. Not just hers, but deeply enmeshed in the rock archetype she’s seeking to perpetuate. Cavale’s savior, we see, is a gentle Jesus, who is meant to survive, but that other ‘saviour’, outside the frame of Cowboy Mouth, is the one Smith knows and draws on: were Buddy Holly, Hank Williams, Richie Valens, even Robert Johnson, and their more contemporary company cited above, suicides or accidents? (Note also the still photographs from the original American production published in the Winter House edition (1972). On the wall behind Shepard and Smith sitting on the “fucked-up bed” in the title roles, Buddy Holly has been prominently scrawled; and the mise-en-scène calls for “Photographs of Hank Williams and Jimmie Rodgers”, 85).

The bipolarity and intimations of annihilation alternate with endearments and sophomoric domesticity. Slim and Cavale role-play, cavort, cajole, caress, like an old couple dance a slow waltz. Cavale’s second installment of the doomed Orphic poet is the nineteenth-century French poet Gerard de Nerval, who “hung himself on my birthday. My birthday. And some lady tole my mom I was made from a hanged man. Poor bastard. And Slim, he had a crow too. Just like Raymond” (92). Cavale’s death-wish (“I’m sick of telling about people killing themselves, it makes me jealous”, ibid.) is almost as unconvincing as Slim’s attachment to his unreal family, but it spurs him to another musical effort, this time on electric guitar, with “Have No Fear”, which equalizes the worst with the best, finds acceptance of both and the avoidance of escape (“So don’t run/ Let it come/ Let it go/ Let it rock and roll”, 93) possible within the freedom of music and its invocation of the unconscious. Slim is practicing for Cavale’s molding of him despite himself.

They have in the meantime ordered extravagant food from the Lobster Man. Who is the Lobster Man? Dressed as a lobster, he brings plenitude, only grunts, but comes when called. As Slim will elaborate subsequent to this first appearance, lobsters inhabit the depths of oceans, have “an ancient, sea-green strength” (106) both implicative of something radically inscrutable, as well as passively amenable to the projections imposed upon it/him. Unable to articulate language, as Slim and Cavale almost unwillingly do, the Lobster Man can’t divulge his inner life in words, as their frustration with him confirms. Present, but obscure, obedient but silently unsettling, come from the deeps with its “strength of the ages” the Lobster Man is symbolic of the unconscious. It is Slim, notably, ambivalent Orpheus, who invites him in, who pesters him and turns on him when he can’t answer any of Slim’s questions. Here though, Slim is still only concerned with mundane nourishment, as he feasts on junk food, and continues to blame Cavale for his own blindness:

SLIM: […] You’ve put a curse on me! I have a wife and a life of my own! Why don’t you let me go! I ain’t no rock-and-roll star. That’s your fantasy. You’ve kept me cooped up here for how long has it been now? […] A long fucking time. And I’m still not a star! How do you account for that?
CAVALE: I don’t know. I never promised nothin’.
SLIM: But you led me on. You tempted me into sin.
CAVALE: Oh, fuck off.
SLIM: Well, it’s true. What am I doing here? I don’t know who I am anymore […]
CAVALE: You can go if you want.
SLIM: I don’t want! I do want! I don’t want! I want you! (107).

But just as Cavale’s bad-ass posturing is readily deflated by Slim’s suddenly untypical criticism of her grammar (how much are these characters simply Shepard and Smith? How much is theatre and how much meta-theatrical biography? ), the mystique built up around the rock savior is deconstructed via still another generic tone: emotional realism. Slim, seemingly closer to consensual ‘reality,’ wonders “How come we’re so unhappy?” (96), and after the kind of cognitive-behavioural therapy in which “we’ll change the time of year to fall” (ibid.) because it’s Cavale’s favourite season (and just as he’d earlier taken her on an imaginary walk down to an imaginary shoe-store to steal her an imaginary pair of tap-shoes, though she’d been after the real thing)—(which of them is the real con-artist?)—he quite genuinely asks of Cavale, as an audience-member might of the play: “…tell me what it means to be a rock ‘n roll star […] so I’ll have something to go by” (ibid.).

Graham’s suggestion that “elements of Absurdism, Surrealism and Expressionism are skillfully juxtaposed with elements of Realism to achieve a style which I will refer to as Metarealism” (Graham, 50) is helpful here. She suggests that “Cowboy Mouth…contains almost all elements which, by the time of this writing, have become quintessential Shepard. Unlike many of the early plays, in Cowboy Mouth Shepard employs elements of Expressionism, Absurdism and Realism in an almost balanced blend” (51). On this reading Slim might be said to be the voice of a recognizable realism, Cavale the hyperbolic expressionist, and the appearance of the Lobster Man the object of absurd inscrutability which adds a synthesizing apex to the antithetical, bi-polarized, even claustrophobic horizontal dynamic, of the sum of their parts.

Cavale does answer Slim’s earlier question, in a long monologue which is the thematic heart of the play. But not a Shepardian aria; Patti Smith’s earnest post-Beat romanticism is too evident and Slim’s monosyllabic punctuation like the practiced playwright Shepard sitting back, disengaged, to comment: “No, baby, it’s beautiful” (99). The important words are:

CAVALE: […] It’s like, well, the highest form of anything is sainthood […] People want a street-angel. They want a saint but with a cowboy mouth. Somebody to get off on when they can’t get off on themselves. I think that’s what Mick Jagger is trying to do…what Bob Dylan seemed to be for awhile. A sort of god in our image…ya know?
[…] I want it to be perfect, ‘cause it’s the only religion I got. […] in the old days people had Jesus and those guys to embrace…they created a god with all their belief energies…and when they didn’t dig themselves they could lose themselves in the Lord. But it’s too hard now. We’re earthy people and the old saints just don’t make it and the old God is just too far away. He don’t represent our pain no more. His words don’t shake through us no more. Any great motherfucker rock-’n-roll song can raise me higher than all of Revelations. We created rock-‘n-roll from our own image, it’s our child […] It’s like…the rock-‘n-roll star in his highest state of grace will be the new savior […] rocking to Bethlehem to be born. Ya know what I mean, Slim? (99).

Slim remains obdurate: “Well, fuck it, man. I ain’t no savior” (ibid.). Perhaps it’s the almost cloying naiveté of Cavale’s religiosity he distrusts. Her assumption, for example, that “the highest form of anything is sainthood” is loaded with a piousness otherwise repudiated by the hedonic ironies of the counterculture, once it had got over its salvific innocence destroyed, by most reckonings, in the violence of 1968 and the ensuing years of Vietnam. Cavale, for her part, fantasises sainthood herself: “and me…I dream of being one”, but something unclear disqualifies her for the role: “But I can’t. I mean I can’t be the saint people dream of now” (ibid.) The only distinguishing features she draws between the old-style saint and contemporary imperatives is that: “People want a street angel. They want a saint but with a cowboy mouth” (ibid.).

Cowboy mouth. Another metaphor central to the subtextual terms of the play, as the Lobster Man is symbolic of its non-verbal depths (where both musical expression and symbolism subsume and transcend the discursively verbal). Cowboy mouth:—street angel, rough diamond, hipster innocent, flawed genius, poète maudit, Western hero, solitary quester in unknown lands, restorer of natural justice in a climate where the civilized version has gone awry. We can’t be entirely sure just why Cavale can’t enact the dream—because she’s a woman? because she’s lame? too much a crafty hatcher of image and myth to be able to sustain one herself? (These queries are interesting also in the contrasting light of Smith herself, who in a musical period dominated by the male-shamanic stirrer of mass ecstasies has been able to successfully sustain her own version of the street angel-rock poet for forty years.) If it’s not obvious why Cavale can’t play the part, we can be sure that she projects the same fully and squarely onto the unremarkable, adolescent person of Slim. The eloquence of her long speech lines are answered by him with an ugly, unimaginative repudiation of her vision: “You fucking cunt!” or “I ain’t no savior” (100).

Slim might have the leaden masculinity of a cowboy, but does he have the necessary muse? If he’s Orpheus, perhaps it’s as an Orpheus maudit, a little like the sardonic Dylan or Lennon who weren’t entirely willing and didn’t quite fulfil, the spiritual expectations of their early devotees. Cavale tells Slim: “But you’ve got it. You’ve got the magic. You could do it. You could be it” (ibid.), though we see little evidence of what it might be in Slim. While Slim softens as the play progresses, Shepard’s writing of the character consistently downplays the kind of florid idealism Cavale is so intent on enacting. She’s the nerdy poet who pesters the nice-guy sports jock slumming it (Henry IV-style) in bohemia: he tolerates her but only for so long, to the point where it seems she and her fantasies are for real, and he can’t follow her.

The other telling assumption in Cavale’s speech is that “the old saints just don’t make it and the old God is just too far away. He don’t represent our pain no more” (99). Not merely a re-statement of the familiar post-war Existential, then countercultural, rejection of traditional Christian theism, Cavale’s article of faith would seem to also suggest that the common human pain is itself different now: “We’re earthy people,” but God’s “words don’t shake through us no more” (ibid.). Is her complaint merely one of form, such that the contemporaneous thirst for transcendence in rock lyrics can replace, and so improve upon, the old (dead?) Holy Word?: “Any great motherfucker rock ‘n roll song can raise me higher than all of Revelations.”

How much is Cavale’s version of spiritual insight a mature response to the received one she rejects, or merely a self-absorbed rebellion against a surrender of self she—the post-adolescent culture she speaks for—can’t risk? How much self-gratification is there in the desire to “get off on [somebody] when they can’t get off on themselves”? Her formulations refer back to herself and her needs: rock ‘n roll ‘raises her higher’, and perhaps an obvious betrayal of her solipsism: “We created rock ‘n roll from our own image, it’s our child…a child that’s gotta burst in the mouth of a savior” (my italics).

Why exactly does rock ‘n roll have to burst its boundaries, become spiritualized in the same or similar terms to that old religion Cavale/Smith disavows? Doesn’t her fervor conjure a more radical disjunction (more Dionysian than Christian) with civilization, entirely set free of old forms and rituals? (Again, think of the paroxysmic rock-highs of performers such as Hendrix and Joplin). Cavale’s rock triad of Rock ‘n Roll, the loss of God, and the hunger for a new Messiah can be read as pop culture, and the sexuality it encodes, rejecting History to produce a bastard offspring that keeps the features of the Father/father but disowns the spiritual authority H/he has carried thus far. Hence the dislocation, sense of abrupt discontinuities between these characters (and Shepard’s plays generally) and any kind of historical, even sacred, context that might form a ground to their contingency, avoid that inflation of self concomitant with the words messiah, rock ‘n roll star, savior, whether slouching, or as here “rocking to Bethlehem to be born” (99, my italics).

Richard Gilman’s words are helpful here: “’Identity’ and ‘roots’ merge as themes in Shepard. For if the American Dream means anything more than its purely physical and economic implications, it means the hope and promise of identity, of a ‘role’…Inseparable from this is the hope of flexibility, of suppleness in the distribution of roles—the opportunities of being seen—such as was largely absent from the more fixed and closed European world. In turn this promise, sometimes fulfilled, is met with the ironic condition of rootlessness, lack of continuity and ground. The effect of this in Shepard’s theater is either to crush or literally deracinate—tear the mind from its roots—the seeking self or to hyperbolize it into flamboyance, violence, or the ultimate madness, the fever for what we call ‘stardom’” (Gilman, xx). What Gilman describes as the ultimate madness, would seem to be just the mythology Cavale has entered into, the consummation of self she renews in pseudo-salvific terms. But how deep is her vision—is it one of madness or freedom from the fractured self and culture it has emerged from?

In looking beyond the modern Christian era, in its incorporation of absurdist, surreal and symbolic imagery—its invitation to the Other, the unconscious, the repressed and forgotten—Cowboy Mouth summons the pre-modern mythic imagination without quite knowing it. Slim probably is Orpheus, without knowing or quite wanting to believe it; Cavale is his Muse. They have intuitions of transcendence, trust in them without knowing why, hold ambivalently to the frail securities of the known (Slim’s family and home, their personal histories) while doubting their full reality or worth. Every time Slim is confused by words, he “gets up and stomps over to the drums […] starts bashing them violently” (97), flays his electric guitar or “jumps up and starts tearing the place apart” (100) in a blind access to an urgent expressivity he’s still barely conscious of. Cavale, similarly, “goes through a million changes. Plays dead. Rebels. Puts on a bunch of feathers and shit to look alluring […] hides in a corner” (97) and so on. Slim and Cavale are largely oblivious to their own experience, unaware of the unconscious motives propelling their behavior. The morphing of personality and desperate assumptions of varied personae are the most characteristic theatrical features of Cowboy Mouth. Nothing in this play is fixed, apart from the entrenched heterogeneity of its performativity.

Gilman, above, emphasizes the performative, “role-playing” nature of Shepard’s (post-Pirandellian) theatre; Cavale’s next words make this ritual play explicit. Slim asks her how he’s meant to become ‘the saviour’; he has no idea himself, a necessary guilelessness for a would-be messiah. He answer points to the eclecticism, the ragged and piecemeal postmodernist process of building a new sacrality of self and culture: “You gotta collect it. You gotta reach out and grab all the little broken busted-up pieces of people’s frustration. That stuff in them that’s lookin’ for a way out or a way in […] The stuff in them that makes them wane see God’s face. An then you gotta take all that into yourself and pour it back out. Give it back to them bigger than life. You gotta be unselfish, Slim. Like God was selfish, He kept Himself hid. He wasn’t a performer. You’re a performer, man” (100). (Perhaps indicating some of Smith’s creative genealogy, it is interesting to note that when asked in a TV interview late in his life what it was he had really sought to achieve in his work, Jack Kerouac had responded in all sincerity ‘I want God to show me his face.’)

Bigger than life. Again, the inflationary sense of Cavale’s vision is ambiguous: who is ultimately gratified—the audience, or the star; the saint, or the ‘sinners’? She does qualify the ‘biggerness’ however with its unselfishness. Yet what seems to make her savior different from the old is merely that the new one has to be a performer, actor of unreal images, which holds the possibility (already prefaced in Cavale’s story of Johnny Ace) that such of psychic authority and power has its inevitable nemesis in the failure of transcendence and the hysteria of the mob. Which again calls forth Orpheus.

III

In his telling of the Orpheus myth, Robert Graves says that “When Dionysus invaded Thrace, Orpheus neglected to honour him, but taught other sacred mysteries and preached the evil of sacrificial murder to the men of Thrace, who listened reverently. Every morning he would rise to greet the dawn on the summit of Mount Pangaeum, preaching that Helius, whom he named Apollo, was the greatest of all gods. In vexation, Dionysus set the maenads upon him […] First waiting until their husbands had entered Apollo’s temple, where Orpheus served as priest, they seized the weapons stacked outside, burst in, murdered their husbands, and tore Orpheus limb from limb. His head they threw into the river Hebrus, but it floated, still singing, down to the sea, and was carried to the island of Lesbos” (Graves, 1960: 112).

Seen in this context, Slim’s reluctance to assume the mantle of contemporary rock priesthood is prescient, though the analogy isn’t entirely smooth. Orpheus, at least in this version of the myth (Graves also gives others, where “Orpheus did not come in conflict with the cult of Dionysus; he was Dionysus” ibid.), is representative of non-violence as Christ is, but not of Dionysus as Cavale would have her countercultural 20th-century brethren be (“We’re earthy people and the old [Christian] saints just don’t make it”). Graves’ Orpheus is instead committed to the solar orderedness and restraint of classical Apollo, even “had condemned the Maenads’ promiscuity and preached homosexual love; Aphrodite was therefore no less angered than Dionysus” (op. cit. 112-13), which doesn’t sound like Cavale’s hetero-dominant territory (but does ring true with what we know of the sexual revolution of the 1960s and especially ‘70s as it was embodied in the ambisexual posturings of Jagger, Joplin, Morrison and other celebrities more reknowned for sexual excesses than musical importance).

What is compelling in Orpheus is the betrayal of the audience and the emotional mechanism that allows the power invested in those who “not only enchanted wild beasts, but made the trees and rocks move from their places to follow the sound of [their] music” (ibid., 111), be so entirely reversed to turn against rapture and destroy the object of projected enchantment. Slim has, like Orpheus, already lost his love (“My wife’s left me. She’s gone to Brooklyn with the kid and left me”, Shepard, 96); he’s hardly about to start a religious revolution, in real terms or the heightened illusory one of Cavale’s spiritual aspiration. All of Slim’s talk comes down to prosaic, small-town American domesticity (an adolescent rehearsal for the almost sepia-toned frontier Americana Shepard has made his own in his more mature work): his Tom Sawyer speeches are about having a dog (“Like any good American boy” op. cit., 95), making childhood dams in rivers (“putting more and more rocks and mud and sticks in to try to stop it”, 101). Cavale also has her prosaic stories (such as playing The Ugly Duckling in school and “when I first put my finger inside me and felt wonderment”, 102); they are the most apparently authentic stories she tells, and even pretends to a house-wifely domesticity herself—“I wanna electric dishwasher […] I don’t have any housewife shit. I want some stuff ladies have” (95-6).

Ultimately these vignettes of shared intimacy, each character attempting grounding in a contextual history almost subtending their immediate alienation, are overwhelmed by the intensity of Cavale’s dream, crippled as she is from the start. After Slim’s failure of conformity to the Orphic template, her disappointment could be Aphrodite’s (though neither of these mere theatrical ‘players’ will be torn limb from limb for their incapacity):

SLIM: […] Get out of my house! Get the fuck out of my house!
CAVALE: This ain’t your house. This is my house.
SLIM: It’s nobody’s house. Nobody’s house.
HE collapses, exhausted from his violence. CAVALE goes to him as if to soothe him, then realizes it’s her dream being busted and not his. SHE starts yelling at him while HE just lies there wiped out.
CAVALE: You’re fucking right—nobody’s house. A little nobody with a big fucking dream. Her only dream. I spread my dreams at your feet, everything I believe in, and you tread all over them with your simpy horseshit. […] I take your world and shake it. Well, you took my fantasy and shit on it. I was doing the streets looking for a man with nothing so I could give him everything. Everything it takes to make the world reel like a drunkard. But you have less than nothing, baby, you have part of a thing. And it’s settled. And if it’s settled I can’t do nothing to alter it. I can’t do shit. I can’t give you nothing. I can’t. I can’t. You won’t let me” (100-1).

The scene is the overt climax of the play, and also encapsulates it. Cavale is impotent, as a woman or visionary or both, dismisses the ‘reality’ of the majority, but her vision still tantalizes. Her words make Cowboy Mouth seem to be about love, or the need for it, the subordination of the woman, and the failure of intuition against the sobriety of domestic regenerativeness. But that’s a ‘realist’ reading, which privileges the stability of self and motivation Gilman has already observed Shepard’s theatre subverting. The climax of the deep image, the one which resonates, comes at the end proper. Cavale’s catharsis is short-lived and they each again quickly fall into quasi-shamanistic, ironic role-play, perhaps merely a projective screen set against their stronger motivations.
Because they soon decide to call the Lobster Man again (“just for laughs” this time, 103). Slim’s realist downhome reminiscences, Cavale’s expressionist melodrama have each played themselves out; the sub-reality of the ambiguous again comes to the fore. Cavale simply picks up the telephone and the Lobster Man is already on the other end. Cavale invites him/It(Id) over because “we need some cheering up” (104). Slim suggests they talk “About what it’s like to be a lobster man. It must be pretty weird, you know. Weirder than being us” (ibid.). Cavale is curiously defensive, the wounds of her previous outburst still close to the surface: “We’re not weird, man. He’s weird but we’re not weird” (ibid.). Each of their symbolic imaginaires is threatened at its roots by the unconscious real, but Slim is willing to risk the loss of what Cavale has so desperately sustained on their behalf. Slim, oblivious but intuitively true, touches the nerve-centre of the play: “We could ask what the bottom of the ocean is like” (ibid.)

It isn’t the woman, but the man, who plunges for the unknown, contra the privileging of feminine intuition Graham draws attention to in discussing the romantic hero in the Shepardian context, earlier. In Cowboy Mouth, the woman has all the admittedly wild words, the wisdom of poetic forebears, but he has the psychic means to will its entry. Cavale only confirms Slim’s sense by imagining the Lobster Man in a hypothetical movie called The Prophet. Slim speaks for Freud: the Lobster Man is “a wily old devil. He’s outfoxed all the fishermen for years and years. He’s never been caught” (105). Where Slim has resisted the Orphic role, here he is eager to plumb deeper, darker depths: less modernistic, post-Christian, salvational; more originary, primordial, atavistic. He wants to get to the innards of what the Lobster Man is, and could be. For the first time in the entire play Slim speaks from his, properly masculine, power: “I could cut through that hard shell and tear his heart out. I could eat his heart. You know that’s what warriors used to do. Primitive warriors. They’d kill their opponent and then tear his heart out and eat it. Only if they fought bravely, though. Because then they believed they’d captured the opponent’s strength” (ibid.).

On its arrival, Slim tells the Lobster Man “Listen, the little lady here and I were discussing how we’d like to get to know you on a more intimate level” (107), but we already know it can only grunt in response. Cavale: “We’d like to know your darkest nightmares, your most beautiful dreams, your wildest fantasies, your hopes, your aspirations” (ibid.). The turn is abrupt; psychoanalytically betraying herself Cavale decides the best way to deal with the unknown is to “just ignore [it] for a while. Pretend like it’s not here” (107-8). Just “leave him here alone […] Let the Lobster Man be the new Johnny Ace. It’s the Aquarian Age. Ya know it was predicted that when Christ came back he’d come as a monster” (108). Unable to stop weaving her discursive Ariadne-like web of reliances, Cavale is the theorist blind to the much more raw data before her. From there the Lobster Man’s transformation is seamless. Slim though tests himself with a confession of resolve he’s been seeking an object for all along:

SLIM: (to LOBSTER MAN) Pretty sneaky […] Squirmin’ yer way into our lives. Pretendin’ dumb. We know you can talk. We know you understand what’s goin’ on. You’ve got the silver, you’ve got the gold. Out with it! Out with it, Lobster Man, or the sun won’t shine on your shiny shell! (109)

Cavale and Slim are talking about a different revelation, with or without a saviour, now. Slim beckons the Other voice to sing, openly now, plays the classic 4-chord rock progression as the subterranean creature reveals its true form. Cavale is a proxy for its words, singing: “Come right here you know you’re not alone/ If you got no savior you can do it on your own” (111), and though the words are pedestrian, they contain a plea for embodiment that finally anchors the transcendence that has typified the tone—at least Cavale’s—of the drama: “Help me to do it/ I was always dreaming too high/ Help me pull my star down from the sky/ Down on the ground/ Where I can feel it/ Where I can touch it/ Where I can be it” (110-11).

Be it. Embodiment and a grounded knowing, an earthbound and a grounded knowing, an earthbound truth: the ‘moral’ of this play? Not quite; Smith and Shepard close, rather, on ambiguity: Slim hands the new rock ‘n roll saviour a gun, eyes off Cavale, and exits. Cavale talks him through what appears to be a conclusive denouement: rock ‘n roll, the Other, the wildcard quantity of the unconscious, the atavism of an Orphic transmission all converging in the singular moment and its singular symbol—summoning again the tragic de Nerval and his pet lobster. De Nerval, significantly, “had visions. He cried like a coyote. He carried a crow” (111). Cavale privileges the imagery of the irrational and the sensorium of the primitive: still the final arbiter, and the compulsions of self-knowledge still to be played out, as in Johnny Ace, de Nerval, Genet, Villon, and her other anti-heroes. Like Orpheus given the gift of oracular speech (Graves: “Orpheus’ head […] prophesied day and night until Apollo […] came and stood over the head, crying: ‘Cease from interference in my business; I have borne long enough with you and your singing!’ Thereupon the head fell silent” (Graves, 1960: 113), the rock ‘n roll savior, born of the unconscious, must risk his own annihilation.

The Lobster Man, too, ritualizes such death, playing Russian Roulette to Cavale’s final words. The pistol just clicks, emptily. Stephen Bottoms’s reading of this conclusion, where “ambiguity gives way to an outright skepticism which swamps the transcendent impulse completely” (Bottoms, 89), is too cynical, and instead of “a grotesque parody of a fantasy salvation” (ibid.), the Lobster Man enacts a suitably loaded restraint that successfully distances and re-configures the egoic exertions of illusory projection that have sent Slim and Cavale in circles all through the preceding. David de Rose (Roudané, 230) writes that “Shepard’s writings would suggest that the rock messiah is an unattainable ideal, the pursuit of which leads to self-delusion or self-destruction” but again this literal reading ignores the psychological imperative of the transference the pursuit, so consistent through cultural history, continues to enact. The Lobster Man, as their hitherto buried unconscious, is saved from total supression, as Orpheus was before his Muse was taken from him. But along with transcendence, the loss of the old self is always at stake. Slim opts out (his being in was only ever nominal, by proxy) just as Dylan or John Lennon, or more recently Kurt Cobain, in their putative (or in the latter’s case, necessary) rejection of the role of spiritual savior, did. Cavale, the poet-intellectual, brains behind the scenes, knows the words but not the numen, the knowing to bestow. What does the Orphic muse tell humanity? Graves, again, offers a variant to the original, another clue: “Some give a wholly different account of how Orpheus died: they say Zeus killed him with a thunderbolt for divulging divine secrets” (Graves, op. cit.).

Divine secrets. Smith and Shepard, in Cowboy Mouth aren’t willing to say what they are, not because they don’t know but because they can’t be said. (They won’t have to die young, as so many of their musical heroes did and would—indeed perhaps always will). Yet in Slim and Cavale, alienated romantic heroes of still another—here psychedelic—phase of Dionysus, they swear by the presence of them. The Lobster Man, left solitary and cold-sweat wet as the stage darkens, is everyone who ever made the same mute attempt, and those audience members—“people [who] want a street angel”—who understand the imperative of trying. The divine secrets are there (say Orpheus and his 20th-century incarnations) but you have to risk everything to discover them.

(Written April, 2000)

REFERENCES

Bottoms, Stephen J. The Theatre of Sam Shepard: States of Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
Gelber, Jack. “Sam Shepard: Playwright as Shaman” in Angel City and other Plays by Sam Shepard. New York: Urizen Books, 1976.
Gilman, Robert. “Introduction” to Sam Shepard: Seven Plays. New York: Bantam Books, 1981.
Graham, Laura J. Sam Shepard: Theme, Image and the Director. New York: Peter Lang, 1995.
Graves, Robert. The Greek Myths: Volume 1. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1960.
Hart, Lynda. Sam Shepard’s Metaphorical Stages. New York: Greenwood Press, 1987.
Oumano, Ellen. Sam Shepard: The Life and Work of an American Dreamer. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986.
Roudané, Matthew (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to Sam Shepard. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Shepard, Sam. The Winter Repertory 4: Mad Dog Blues and other plays. New York: Winter House Limited, 1972.
Wade, Leslie. Sam Shepard and the American Theatre. New York: Greenwood Press, 1997.
Wilcox, Leonard (ed.). Rereading Shepard: Contemporary Critical Essays on the Plays of Sam Shepard. London: Macmillan, 1993.

Copyright © 2013 Martin Kovan

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This essay discusses the general context for the Tibetan self-immolations of 2009 to 2013, as well as the sole Western self-immolation committed in solidarity with them by an English Tibetan Buddhist monk in November, 2012. The essay was published in print (March, 2013) and online (April 3, 2013) in Overland Literary Journal, and is copyright to the author.

feature | Martin Kovan

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This essay considers some meta-ethical questions that emerge from a consideration of the phenomena of terrorism in the context of Buddhist metaphysics: what, in the Buddhist view, ultimately causes terrorism (and its subsidiary effects)? What resources do the Buddhist metaphysical claims of no-self, karma, emptiness and related concepts bring to a meta-ethical understanding of terrorism and its effects?

Written in 2005; published May, 2012 in SOPHIA International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, Metaphysical Theology and Ethics: http://www.springerlink.com/openurl.asp?genre=article&id=doi:10.1007/s11841-012-0309-1

Digital Object Identifier (DOI) 10.1007/s11841-012-0309-1

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This essay presents a general and critical historical survey of the Burmese Buddhist alms-boycott (pattanikujjana) between 1990 and 2007. It details the Pāli textual and ethical constitution of the boycott and its instantiation in modern Burmese history, particularly the Saffron Revolution of 2007. It also suggests a metaethical reading that considers Buddhist metaphysics as constitutive of that conflict. Non-violent resistance is contextualized as a soteriologically transcendent (“nibbanic”) project in the common life of believing Buddhists—even those who, military regime and martyred monastics alike, defend a fidelity to Theravāda Buddhism from dual divides of a political and humanistic fence. Presented to the International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS) conference, Taiwan, June 20-25, 2011. First published in the Journal of Buddhist Ethics, April, 2012: http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2012/04/16/the-burmese-alms-boycott/

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High-classic Gandhara style, Pakistan. Circa 2nd/3rd century AD. Carved from a hard grey schist. Recovered from Swat, Pakistan, early 1960’s.

 In his well-known advice to the Kalamas, who have expressed confusion and doubt around the truth-claims of different spiritual teachers, the Buddha makes a remarkable injunction. Walpola Rahula calls it “unique in the history of religions.” [1] In the Kalama Sutta, the Buddha says that

Yes, it is proper that you have doubt, that you have perplexity, for a doubt has arisen in a matter which is doubtful. Now, look you Kalamas, do not be led by reports, or tradition, or hearsay. Be not led by the authority of religious texts, nor by mere logic or inference, nor by considering appearances, nor by the delight in speculative opinions, nor by seeming possibilities, nor by the idea: ‘this is our teacher’.[2]

This extensive list of negations begs the question of just where the Kalamas might find the reassurance they seek. If Buddhism is valued as a religion teleologically grounded in praxis rather than metaphysics, such an injunction clearly carries a primary significance. The Buddha also, of course, recommends the Four Noble Truths and Eightfold Path and encourages the institution of a renunciate order which embodies and substantiates that model. Yet here at least the implicit suggestion is that prior to any concession to it, must come individual (rather than consensual or authority-mediated) judgement of the model as such.

One implication of the Buddha’s words is that the only source the Kalamas can look to for any certainty is one that is already in their possession, in their own capacity for judgement for what is (the Buddha goes on to say): ‘good and wholesome’ (kusala). The question still remains then, in what precisely does such judgement consist? And more specifically, in what final subjective authority does such judgement inhere? Because the Buddha has already made it clear that in virtually every sense it cannot derive from an external or social, and so in some sense unreliable, source. It can’t even, finally, rely on the revelation of the Awakened One himself: “a disciple should examine even the Tathagata himself, so that he might be fully convinced of the true value of the teacher”.[3] This clearly begs another question: How can a disciple judge the true value of a teacher without having some prior sense or understanding of what it is that makes a teacher valuable? That is, of knowing already, in some sense, what the teacher claims to know?

Siddhartha Gautama faces the same problem. He at least twice leaves everything to seek his own way.[4] He enters into a second renunciation when he leaves first his Brahmanic (probably Sankhya) teachers, and then his yogi colleagues after six years of forest austerities and practice with them, for an absolute solitude without the validation or religious succour of a worldly authority, or a rishi, or a father figure[5].

This moment of the Buddha’s pre-enlightenment experience – what I’m calling his second renunciation – has received little if any exclusive scholarly attention[6], and its possible ‘genetic’ relation to the developmental shifts of Buddhist practice beyond its traditional cultural bases, essentially none at all[7]. In their recent university-level textbooks for example, each published within the last 5 years, Prebish & Keown, and Donald Mitchell, are typical in framing Gautama’s progress as simply that of an aspiring mendicant who remains technically unsatisfied with existing yogic disciplines and their results. The question of autonomy as such, or its implied need, is not raised.

But Gautama’s second renunciation, much less generally remarked than that of his first, is different and more subtle because it appears to be a response to his own failure in the mission he has originally abandoned his worldly life to pursue. The deliverance Gautama has hoped to secure with his Sankhya teachers Alara Kalama and Uddaka Ramaputta has left him dissatisfied, despite the great discipline and awareness to which he has attained.[8] (Karen Armstrong at least, in her biography of the Buddha, thinks so). Gautama needs to go back, by going forward, to look at the assumptions and first ground from which he has started out. His received religious and intellectual structures have internally failed him, and the only thing he has left to guide him is his own intuitive process. That’s a rudimentary characterisation, but all that can really be said on the evidence, yet it is still telling enough for that. Because if it sounds familiar it might be because a similar state of spiritual affairs is being articulated with increasing transparency by many (not all) of the elders of what is known as ‘Western Buddhism’.

In a discussion of Buddhist studies in a postmodern context, the American scholar Mark Unno suggests that “the power to doubt thoroughly, to examine critically, and to recognise the truly radical character of intellectual, cultural, and religious diversity in a multicultural world are integral to the project of Buddhist thought in a postmodern world”.[9] Such doubt finds a lucid respone in the well-known theses of Stephen Batchelor, as a self-described “agnostic [now in 2010 an atheist] Buddhist.” Without dwelling on Batchelor’s well-rehearsed interpretations of rebirth, karma and Mahayanist cosmology, it is more to the point here to focus on how he grounds his sense of doubt in the existential immediacy of the question from which it emerges. He says,

The way of the Buddha is a living response to a living question. Yet whenever it has become institutionalised its vital response has become a well-formulated answer. The seemingly important task of preserving a particular set of answers often causes the very questions which gave rise to those answers to be forgotten.[10]

Stephen Batchelor

Batchelor values as primary the “stammering voice that asks the questions”[11] because without it authentic spiritual enquiry becomes compromised by that shift of focus which, after Heidegger, supplants “meditative questioning” with “calculative questioning”[12]. For Batchelor, calculative questioning based on a prescriptive reliance on dogma renders the original imperative of all spiritual practice misdirected: “Belief, whether in a teacher, a doctrine, or even one’s experience, retreats from the questions behind a shield of protective views and concepts”.[13]

For Batchelor, original ignorance is compromised by a largely conceptual, even defensive, frame of representation inadequate to the depth of need which introduced enquiry in the first place. Conceptual security is more serious than a category mistake, because what is really at risk is not so much truth as genuine insight. Significantly, the doubt that questions is also potentially “a response that leads not to further knowledge about any particular thing but to wisdom as a whole”.[14] He also suggests that “this existential perplexity is the very place within us where awakening is the closest. To deny it and adopt a comforting set of beliefs is to renounce the very impulse that keeps one on track”.[15]

Batchelor’s proposition points up a paradox: the doubt that maintains an authentic and so groundless frame for itself “can never rest content with any answer”,[16] yet it is only via such a consistent modus of uncertainty that questioning ultimately, at least for Batchelor, provides the space for a “wisdom of the whole” – not an ‘answer’ per se but a ‘response’ to questioning as a Gestalt – to emerge. The form the response takes cannot be necessarily pre-empted by any one view, Buddhist or otherwise – even where such a response might identify as a Buddhist one.

John Makransky’s critique of Batchelor’s “bad habit” of ahistoricism in “[asserting] a new hegemony over Dharma by re-constructing it narrowly within the presuppositions of his own place and time (in his case, a post Western-enlightenment agnosticism)” overstates the case, but would be true enough if Batchelor’s intention was purely that of an attempted re-authentication of the Buddha’s original teaching. But that is the lesser concern of Batchelor’s project, which is oriented purely to effective, meaningful praxis. And praxis in this case is a-historical, insofar as self-reflexive consciousness has no choice but to engage with the givens of its own phenomenological content, rather than try to historically objectify (and so conceptually mediate) everything it perceives.

Why Batchelor’s apparent bias towards a ‘post Western-enlightenment agnosticism’ is such a bad place to start from is also unclear. The position is shared by much of the advanced contemporary mind in its engagement with the latest research in science, social theory, ethics as well as religion. His Holiness the 14th Dalai Lama, for example, is very sympathetic to its sane humanity, as against (for example) exclusivist fundamentalism of any colour. Batchelor is only being true to his time, which on Makransky’s own analysis of the evolution of the dharma is what all travellers on the dharma-path must be in any case. How any temporal, conditioned, socially-constructed view is capable in any case of “asserting a hegemony over Dharma” (Makransky uses a Capital D), is left unexplained. Batchelor would be the first to disclaim even that possibility, and the dharma under that designation would seem big and old enough to look after itself. Despite the doubt and scepticism from which it emerges, Batchelor’s working position however is succinct and unambiguous, even while it leaves all answers open: “The end for which the Buddhist path is a means can only be the penetration of this mystery of being thrown into birth only to be ejected again at death”.[17]

Such an existential focus is central also to the work of Professor David Loy. As a speculative philosopher and Zen-contemplative of transpersonal social identities, Loy has for twenty years articulated many of the shifts of emphasis in evolving Western representations of the dharma. In Lack and Transcendence (1996), his recontextualisation of Buddhist doctrine provides a philosophical underpinning to the kind of emergent dharma evident in a wide cross-section of contemporary Buddhist practice.[18] Loy proposes that a deep intuition of the ontological un-reality, or groundlessness, of the subject-self, gives rise to the complex of anxiety and displacement reactions that characterise contemporary unhappiness.[19]

Professor David Loy

He says

our lives suffer from a lack of meaning that disguises itself as consumerism and a host of other addictions. Having lost our spiritual grounding […] and more recently our faith in technological progress as an alternative of self-grounding, we experience our groundlessness as an unbearable lightness of being. The tragic dialectic between security and freedom reasserts itself: having attained some measure of self-determination and confronted the lack at its core, we now crave the grounding that would connect our aspirations with something greater than ourselves.

Yet, we soon find, as does Siddhartha Gautama in his initial religious project, that such grounding isn’t ultimately forthcoming: the terms shift, states arise and pass, no final certainty waits on either the secular or religious horizon.

Loy describes both Western existential and psychoanalytical analyses of the ensuing anxiety as ones which recognise the repression of death-awareness (in Becker and Heidegger), as well as the ontological ‘nothingness’ inherent in consciousness (in Sartre), as the bases of human suffering, but suggests both analyses are inadequate to the further analysis which Buddhism provides: the ultimate emptiness (sunya), of selves, the phenomenal world, and consciousness itself.[20]

For Loy, Western anxiety as an epiphenomenon of ontological doubt is in fact a necessary and useful signal of authenticity: he aligns it with Kierkegaard’s positive analysis of Angst which when deeply contemplated potentially yields to an apprehension of the presence, and salvation, of God, or in Buddhist terms, the actual emptiness of self.[21] Unconscious Western attempts to displace the ontological insecurity of an illusory ‘I’ in reifying self-investments in fame, material wealth or the romantic projection of personal love, are all deferring the profound truth modern anxiety might be pointing to: that the foundational image of ‘self’ that Western civilisation both exacerbates and struggles with, in a vicious circle of dependency, has reached a critical point of self-doubt in the same way that Zen Buddhist contemplation, for example, deliberately struggles with its Great Doubt in order to ascertain the ‘right view’ of sunyata.[22] Religious (including Buddhist) faith itself might therefore for Loy function as only another ‘displacement’ of doubt, an aggrandisation of the illusory self, so still another form of ‘bad faith’.[23] In Loy’s analysis then, and much like Batchelor’s, doubt is a directly functional, already-pervasive and essential, element of authentic spiritual enquiry – ironically, the ‘ground’ of an ultimately illusory struggle that nonetheless is precisely the grist for the spiritual mill that must be faced before the truth of the so-called ‘Buddhist’ apprehension of sunyata might be realised.[24]

We can now briefly return to Gautama, the soon-to-be Buddha. Why does he register such repeated doubt, such moves toward some version of autonomy, a total freedom from his prior context? What is it saying about his process, that he is compelled to do so at all? Is it a frustration, or an essential development? John Caputo, with respect to the contemporary Western philosophy of religion, approves of a Derridean “messianic postmodernism”, or negative theology that is both radically subjectivised (after Kierkegaard) and post-secular, and with Derrida he invokes the Abrahamic “I am here!” as its fitting expression. Kyongsuk Min responds to such a focus on a radical, subjectivised alterity with the suggestion that “a periodic ‘contamination’ of religion with negative theology should be a wholesome exercise that would challenge each religion to transcend its determinacy and probe its own messianic depth for the impossible possibility of the wholly other.” Note the use of the word “wholesome”, or, returning to the Kalama Sutta, the Pali “kusala”. I would claim a congruent dynamic in the current case, both of Gautama’s process (pace progress), and some dimensions of that of Western Buddhism at the current time.

The Buddha’s ‘second renunciation’ interrogates the notion of progress itself, because most simply it is not clear what there is to be won. It is a moment that appears to escape, for example, a convenient explanation of ‘perennial’ vs. ‘culturally-constructed’ mystical experience (as if such experience need be so temporally-framed). The force of Gautama’s action, simple as it is, is both negation and aspiration towards an unknown, it metaphorises a nexus of conclusions, as well as new beginnings, to his journey. The Buddha is not yet a Buddha, he is a man merely, paradigmatic of the human condition in a form he will later not be accessible to as the Awakened One. There is a threshold between Gautama’s profane status as a man, and that of his divinity, where he will become both epiphanic Man, and wholly unrecognisable as ‘one of us’.[25]

Another senior Western post-Buddhist, who has made a career out of the testing of ambiguity is Alan Clements. As a former monk, Buddhist teacher, culturally engaged dharma-activist, stage-monologuist and (self-described) “spiritually-incorrect revolutionary of the spirit”[26], Clements is concerned to ground dharma practice in individual subjective experience, particularly insofar as that subject responds to the pressing background of human rights and critical global conditions.[27] Clements has spoken of his own apprenticeship as a monk  in Burma under the guidance of Sayadaw U Pandita:

I apprenticed with him [and]…learned the artistry, so to speak, of manifesting a more liberated expression of being. In that process, however, there was something else that came through that I would call ideology, dogma, religion…Suddenly, here was this whole Buddhist cosmology – a doctrine of totality – right in front of me. Resplendent with karma, rebirth, heaven, hell, nirvana, psychic powers and Buddhahood, spiritual perfection itself… One predicated on the belief that the Buddha was omniscient. It took me seven years…I downloaded an entire religion.[28]

Alan Clements

After seven years as a monastic, Clements disrobed to work as a lay retreat-leader and teacher of Vipassana meditation. Some years later the country that had sheltered and taught him the centuries-old authentic practises of Theravada self-enquiry was engulfed in totalitarian tyranny: his fellow-monks and friends imprisoned or killed by the rampaging military of General Ne Win, threatened by the nation-wide thirst for democracy. Clements re-entered Burma illegally, with a spontaneous desire to aid his friends in their hour of need: a remarkable impulse, when he might easily have returned to the comfort of worldly security in the U.S.A. He describes the return as such: “Once in, my heart cracked open. No amount of meditation or spiritual training could have prepared me for what I witnessed. I walked into a full-scale ‘ethnic cleansing’…My views about life and the dharma have never been the same”.[29] His subsequent experiences in the former Yugoslavia during 1995, perhaps still more horrific, only confirmed this profound confrontation with life unmediated by a frame of potential transcendence, release into nirvana, hopes of a pure realm: such intentions became, literally, irrelevant.[30] The confrontation, however, could only result in a deep awe of actual conditions, not a supposed transcendence from them. It seemed to Clements that if there was such a thing as ultimate ‘freedom’ from such conditions, a state where their currency of suffering didn’t exist, it would only be by enquiring radically into the self-nature of the world as it is, rather than, emptiness-wise, as it isn’t, that it might be found.[31]

Further, the assumption of a transcendent freedom might have its own bases thereby interrogated, only narrowly engaged with the task of being ‘in’ life, rather than outside of it – somewhere, hypothetically, ‘else’.[32] Clements’ extreme experience was able to deliver a powerful moment of insight, an awareness of the indivisibility of experience as both the mysterium tremendum and only ontological ground from which to perceive the same: “there is no other life”.[33]

For Clements Buddhist practice also becomes grounded in a paradoxical reversal as well as fidelity to its traditional formulation: unless it is inspired by a thorough investment in this world and its multivalenced process (as against, for example, the total renunciation of the Theravada), it is a gratuitous project which loses meaning precisely by virtue of its unworldliness.[34] Yet insofar as it grounds itself in a commitment to the Other, it is also a classically Mahayana path, which only insists that renunciation, also, be revisioned as an engaged but unattached relation to the world, rather than a dualistic dismissal of it.[35]

Clements perhaps goes further than Batchelor in dismissing the idealist claims of full Buddhist enlightenment while preserving a genuine commitment to the dharma as a rubric of relatively ‘enlightened’ and compassionate action in the world from a cognitive dimension that perceives interdependent reality more accurately and truly.[36] While his repudiation of teleological enlightenment as unhelpful to his intentions now disclaims him as a Buddhist,[37] Clements is centrally concerned to acculturate Western, individualised agency to the kind of “revolution of the spirit” he adopts from Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi.

Again, like Batchelor, Clements’ scepticism towards the full spectrum of metaphysics doesn’t deny a fully engaged commitment to Buddhist ethics in lived life. With this realisation, and his subsequent evolution into what might be described as a non-aligned, non-religious, life-affirming, existential-immanent dharma, Clements articulates a difficult spiritual value that is both wholly traditional as well as radically contemporary. It is a position that valorises both, focussing deeply on its own expression of authentic freedom: that it is to be found in the given context of everything that has formed the unique self, rather than it’s ‘not-self’, even where that self partakes freely in an ancient and coherent class of universal religious values.[38] Clements is facilitating that empowerment in which the unique actual self, in its engagement with a plethora of competing metaphysics (even within the buddhadharma alone, let alone other religious systems), is able to enter into a process of awakening, itself necessarily unique, from the authentic ground of experience as-it-is.

The Buddha famously described the dharma as a raft that is used to cross the river of dukkha, but that it may confidently be relinquished once the other side of suffering is reached. The statement implies a truth the value of which is not merely that of a literal, diagnostic prescription, but more deeply symbolises the dharma as a container, a vessel, an alchemical crucible for the transformation of immaterial consciousness, and it too as empty of inherent existence.

Batchelor, Loy and Clements similarly seek a revalorisation of the primary, even primordial, intuitions of Buddhist enquiry: without such a focus on the properly individual sources of existential disquiet, any subsequent adoption of a rationalised schema for belief or action potentially risks neglecting the origins of authentic spiritual transformation. Such a stance, defined in the three moves of doubt, groundlessness and autonomy is confirmed almost to the word in Unno’s claim that

Doubt as a formal principle of enquiry, critical reason as an autonomous faculty of systematic thinking, and the self-reflexive location of subjectivity as integral to a larger, discursive objectivity are three important moments in the development of theology and religious studies in a diverse postmodern world…

But the story still requires a conclusion. Near Uruvela, on the banks of the Nairanjara River, Siddartha Gautama almost dies during his period of crisis. Armstrong vividly describes him as clad in hemp, or naked, growing dangerously malnourished, subsisting sometimes on only his own faeces and urine. Is this derelict the future Buddha? What has happened here, where are his dignity, his signs of inevitable transcendence? His spine meets his navel, his hair falls out, his skin withers and blackens. Even the gods, passing by, ignore him because he seems already a dead man. These details are in the Majjhima Nikaya, but what do they signify? Why would the Buddha be reduced to this just before his miraculous breakthrough? Because he must endure such trials in order to discover the unparalled life that lies on the other side of them? If so, is that also the case with what immediately follows?

Because what follows is that Gautama realises he has failed his ascetic companions, who look to him as their superior, and must leave them too. He could give up and return to his earlier teachers: for the company, to belong if anything to some human guild; he could even return to his wife and child waiting in the palace. (In some sense he hasn’t really succeeded even in leaving there, is still as “doomed to rebirth” as any householder).

But he doesn’t. He leaves – again. There is no-one who can tell him, now, where it is he needs to go. He could simply stay where he is, but he goes again, to somewhere new, and this time he goes there on his own. 

(A paper presented at the Australasian Association of Buddhist Studies (AABS) conference, Sydney, Dec. 2007)

 

Copyright © 2007 Martin Kovan


NOTES

[1] Rahula suggests it is “unique in the history of religions” (1974: 2-3).

[2] Sharma, Arvind 1997: 140

[3] Ibid. p. 141

[4] Armstrong, Karen 2000, p. 56-9.

[5] Trungpa, Chogyam 1985: 11-12.

[6] Prebish & Keown (2006: 33-35) and Mitchell (2002: 16) are representative in framing Gautama’s progress as simply that of an aspirant mendicant who remains technically unsatisfied with existing yogic disciplines and their results. The question of autonomy as such, or its implied need, is not raised.

[7] Doubt, however, as a functional dimension of dharma practice is considered in Sharma, 1997, Goldstein, Joseph 2002; cf. Nishitani, Keiji1983 and Abe, Masao 1986, 1997, on the “Great Doubt” of Zen.

[8] Armstrong, op.cit.

[9] Unno, in Jackson & Makransky, 2000: 196.

[10] Batchelor, Stephen 1990: 3

[11] Ibid.

[12] Ibid. p.37 ff.

[13] Ibid. p.3

[14] Ibid. p.4

[15] Ibid. p.16

[16] Ibid. p.4

[17] Batchelor, op. cit. p. 10

[18] Loy’s thinking works within a Western philosophical academic frame informed by a decades-long Zen Buddhist practice and residence in East Asia: any study of Buddhist theory requires, from the beginning, more than a purely cognitive apprehension of its ideas. By its nature, Buddhist metaphysics points towards a thorough cognitive, self-reflexive exhaustion of (erroneous and other) conceptual frames, with the direct view to seeing-into and beyond them. (Loy, 1996: 24, and Abe, 1986: 4). Similarly, in a discussion of the norms for contemporary academic Buddhist theology, Cabezon sees such equal valorisation of theory and contemplative praxis as grounded historically in the Indo-Tibetan tradition: “…it’s attempt to balance theory and practice – the conceptual study of doctrine and its internalisation in meditation – serves as a continual reminder that the Buddhist theological task must take both into account, and that it can be reduced to neither” (Jackson & Makransky, 2000: 34. Cf. also Alan Wallace, B. 2000: 67 ff. in the same volume.) This point also applies equally well to the work of Batchelor and Clements as longtime meditation teachers.

[19] Loy, 1996: 12ff.

[20] Ibid. p.xiii. Similarly, the Buddha struggled with a binary polarisation between the essentialism of the Hindu Vedanta and the substantial existence of an atman-Self, and the nihilism of absolute non-existence, before he could arrive at his own apprehension of the Middle Way emptiness of dharmas and selves. (Nagarjuna, 1986: 9).

[21]Loy, 1996: 64-5. (For a parallel analysis, cf. Abe, 1986: 6-7).

[22] Ibid. p. 172

[23] Ibid. p.62

[24] cf. Abe, 1986: 14.

[25] Schuon points to the ambiguity: “To transcend the ego is to transcend the human, although one could say, from another point of view, that this transcending is “human” in the sense that it constitutes the specific excellence of man or his supreme aim.” Schuon, Frithjof 1993: 13-14).

[26] cf. also Clements Spiritually Incorrect DVD, 2006.

[27] Clements, 2003.

[28] Inquiring Mind, Spring, 2003 (hereaf. IM).

[29] Ibid.

[30] Clements, 2003: 183 ff.

[31] Ibid. p. 184-8

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid. p. 195-6

[34] Ibid. p.186

[35] Ibid. p. 206 ff.

[36] Ibid. p.187

[37] personal communication, 6 July, 2006

[38] Clements, 2003: 244-9

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Published 2008 Colloquy #15:  www.colloquy.monash.edu.au/issue015/kovan.pdf

This is a tripartite essay excerpted from a longer text which explores some of the central issues of a contemporary Buddhist ethics: how viable are Buddhist claims to awakening in relative terms? In which senses can they address the multitude of precipitous cultural, economic or religious determinations of different peoples with their often heterogeneous concerns? It asks how we read the ultimate metaphor of awakening in real terms, and in the asking, turns the question back onto the way in which our reading of it transforms, or fails to transform, our lived experience.

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Published in Journal of Buddhist Ethics # 16, 2009: http://blogs.dickinson.edu/buddhistethics/2010/05/10/violence-and-non-resistance-buddhist-ahi%e1%b9%83sa-and-its-existential-aporias/

A long essay looking at an episode described in Alan Clements’ book Instinct for Freedom. I consider the Buddhist ethical grounds for Burmese former monks taking up arms against their own military oppressors in the long resistance against the regime of General Than Shwe (and his predecessors). Derrida and Levinas provide non-Buddhist ethical perspectives which underpin my otherwise Buddhist discussion of the philosophical implications of a non-dual ‘ethics of emptiness’.

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